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SECURE MULTICAST IN INTERNET-WIDE VPNS
Alexander Heinlein and Michael Rossberg and Guenter Schaefer
Ilmenau University of Technology
ABSTRACT
The shifting of sensitive communication into the
potentially hostile Internet, led to the extensive de-
ployment of virtual private networks (VPNs), allowing
cheap, yet private information exchange over public
infrastructures. Despite being standardized for more
than a decade, there is no efﬁcient solution for group
communications in these scenarios, e.g., to distribute
video messages, audio streams and software updates.
To overcome these shortcomings, we developed
a system called Secure Transparent Overlay-Routed
Multicast (STORM) to realize a transparent, single-
source multicast distribution tree for IP-multicast with
the help of a number of distributed algorithms. It is
able to rate nodes based on their age to efﬁciently inte-
grate mobile nodes and make attacks on availability of
the distribution service more difﬁcult. Further metrics
like delay, bandwidth, and hop count can be consid-
ered to construct and optimize efﬁcient topologies.
Moreover, tree balancing will occur to reduce latency
and improve reliability as well as resilience against
random failures or speciﬁc attacks. Simulative results
demonstrated the adaptability of the topology towards
various optimization goals.
Index Terms— Application Layer Multicast, Vir-
tual Private Network, Peer-to-Peer, Security
1. INTRODUCTION
The last decade has led to a wide deployment of virtual
private networks (VPNs) for the protection of cooper-
ate and governmental networks. These VPNs form ba-
sically overlay topologies on top of the Internet, which
may be either manually or automatically conﬁgured.
As the manual setup of security associations between
gateways turns out to be a complex and error-prone task
that does not scale very well and is insufﬁcient for mo-
bile scenarios, there is a clear trend towards self-conﬁg-
uring networks that employ own functionality for rout-
ing, topology control, and node discovery.
However, the ability to inﬂuence topology and
routing of VPNs automatically does not only simplify
the deployment and administration. It also allows
for the construction of distributed algorithms that
adopt the overlay to environmental conditions such as
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Within this context we
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Fig. 1. Example of a dynamic VPN topology generated
by SOLID
presented an approach called SOLID (Secure Overlay
for IPsec Discovery) in prior work [1], which manages
the task of automatic VPN conﬁguration for complex
IP security (IPsec) infrastructures by creating a ring
structure where all gateways are arranged according
to their internal IP address ranges. Gateway discov-
ery and routing interact in SOLID to dynamically
conﬁgure nested VPNs, like illustrated in Fig. 1.
Starting from this point, the novel ﬂexibility does
not only give the ability to simplify VPN conﬁguration,
but also to provide additional network services to the
end-user. Thereby, the acceptance of additional costs
and efforts to deploy VPNs will be further increased.
One of the perhaps best-suited services, to be
deployed in VPNs, is IP layer multicast as it provides
a mechanism for secure group communication, e.g.
by distributing multimedia data or software updates.
Furthermore, IP multicast is rather easy to adopt by
end system programmers and may help to save scarce
bandwidth, e.g., notebooks of traveling workers con-
nected over a slow connection would no longer have to
individually send a video stream to multiple receivers.
Thus, within this article we present an approach Secure
Transparent Overlay-Routed Multicast (STORM)
to distribute multicast over VPNs with a dynamic
topology control.
STORM implements techniques and ideas from
push-based application-level multicast (ALM) [2] to
realize a fully transparent IP multicast by constructing
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distribution trees with IPsec security associations.
Already during the construction of the multicast trees
different mechanisms ensure that resulting topologies
are efﬁcient as well as resistant to DoS attacks. Tree
balancing is used to reduce latency and improve
reliability in dynamic scenarios. Furthermore, all parts
of the distributed algorithm are implemented within
our conﬁguration mechanism SOLID [1] in a real
Linux environment as well as large scale OMNeT++
simulations.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the
next section goes into a comprehensive set of goals for
the distribution of multicast data in VPNs, followed by
an analysis of the current state of the art. Section 4
covers the principles of STORM, and is accompanied
by a discussion and evaluation in section 5. The article
closes with a conclusion and brief outlook of planned
future developments.
2. OBJECTIVES FOR VPN MULTICAST
The deployment of secure group communication is tied
to the following functional goals:
1. Generic Multicast Distribution: The system
should provide means to perform the delivery
of packets to groups of VPN gateways and
clients in inner networks respectively, allowing
a multicast source to serve considerably more
clients than possible by pure unicast.
2. Transparency: As an adaptation of existing IP
multicast applications to a special VPN protocol,
would imply considerable efforts, an IP multicast
compatible interface must be provided, allowing
clients to use common software to receive and
send multicast packets.
3. Self-Conﬁguration: The additional multicast
service should keep the required amount of
manual conﬁguration at a minimum in order
to be able to adapt to changes in the network
environment and reduce administration costs.
Additionally, the following non–functional objec-
tives should be fulﬁlled as good as possible:
4. Scalability: In order to distribute multicast
streams even to large groups, the mechanism
must be designed in distributed fashion, and
every participating device must only be re-
sponsible for coping with an amount of control
overhead that grows at most logarithmic with
the total number of participants in the system.
5. Dynamics & Robustness: Multicast networks
have to deal with regularly changing topologies
as clients may subscribe to a group to peek at
the content only, and leave shortly afterwards.
Hence, care has to be taken to deal with ﬂuctu-
ating user behavior, and network properties such
as delay and bandwidth.
6. Efﬁciency: To construct efﬁcient distribution
topologies, the following criteria have to be
considered:
(a) Latency: The delay between packet trans-
mission and the delivery to the multicast
members shall be as low as possible in or-
der to allow a real-time service for multi-
media data.
(b) Network load: Not only for reasons of
low latency, but also to reduce the net-
work load, packets should be delivered
using short paths and high bandwidth
connections.
Due to the nature of the VPN environment, the ful-
ﬁllment of the following security objectives against ex-
ternal as well as potential internal attackers is a primary
concern:
7. Conﬁdentiality: The unencrypted multicast
trafﬁc must be accessible only to legitimated
VPN nodes.
8. Data Integrity & Authentication: Likewise,
end-to-end data integrity and authentication
must be guaranteed.
9. Access Control: This objective is twofold. First,
only legitimate devices shall be able to access
the multicast data, and after joining the multicast
group regular reauthentications must ensure that
the access capabilities are still valid. Second, the
ability to send data to a multicast group shall be
restricted to legitimate devices to prevent ﬂood-
ing attacks.
10. Availability: The primary focus of VPNs has
been conﬁdentiality, integrity, and authentica-
tion. However, with the increasing number of
DoS attacks, the stable and resilient construction
of overlay structures becomes a major concern.
Thus, a multicast system must be realized
by completely distributed algorithms in order
to avoid single points of failure, and correct
operation shall be guaranteed as long as a path
to the multicast source is functional. In order
to prevent DoS attacks to the multicast source,
infrastructure hiding techniques need to be
deployed.
3. RELATED WORK
The delivery of generic multicast to end-users over
ALM has been widely discussed over the last decade
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[3]. However, most approaches suffer from missing
security mechanisms and are consequently not suited
for secure group communications.
From a security perspective are speciﬁc VPN ex-
tensions better suited: The Internet VPN Group Man-
agement Protocol (IVGMP) [4] implements multicast
routing on top of an IPsec-based VPN to provide se-
curity mechanisms. However, the VPN endpoints are
controlled by a central device that is needed for con-
ﬁguration, key management, and group joins of VPN
nodes, and thus questioning the scalability, robustness,
and availability of the approach.
A ring-based approach is realized by VRing [5]
with a self-organizing and distributed overlay. To
compensate the long path lengths, an additional spare
ring is introduced allowing a node to reach any other
node with a maximum hop count of 2(
√
N − 1) where
N is the number of group members. However, for
very large topologies this is still not feasible. Also,
as packets arriving on the original ring need to be
forwarded on both rings, additional link stress is
introduced. Furthermore, security mechanisms have
not been considered yet, but are planned for the future.
Dynamic Multipoint VPN (DMVPN) [6, 7] is a
VPN auto-conﬁguration system retailed by Cisco.
It offers multicast distribution by deploying a rather
static overlay network between hub gateways, which
utilize Distance Vector Multicast Routing Protocol
(DVMRP) to perform the actual multicast routing
inside the VPN. Dynamic nodes must connect to one
ore more hubs and simply retrieve multicast data from
them. Drawbacks include complex conﬁguration, low
ﬂexibility, and possible conﬁdentiality problems as all
hubs may eavesdrop all multicast data.
SOT (Secure Overlay Tree for Application Layer
Multicast) [8] discusses the application of the Logical
Key Hierarchy (LKH) [9] to ALM in order to create a
scalable and yet secure multicast distribution scheme.
However, the authors neither address availability issues
nor problems caused by a real world implementation.
Furthermore, the approach is not able to exploit a
secure communication infrastructure like an approach
speciﬁc for VPNs.
4. SECURE TRANSPARENT
OVERLAY-ROUTED MULTICAST (STORM)
As the streaming of live multimedia data and quick de-
livery of status data, e.g., near real-time stock market
information, are believed to be two major applications
to multicast deployment in VPNs, source-to-client la-
tency is a key issue. Thus, when considering the two
fundamental implementation approaches, the creation
of push- and pull-based topologies, the ﬁrst ones of-
fer a clear advantage as every packet is forwarded as
quickly as possible, and no buffering has to take place.
The design space can be further narrowed by an-
alyzing the communication behavior of the different
multicast applications. Multimedia, status information,
and software update data is usually provided by a single
source, or at least a low number of sources. Other ap-
plications where every participant may transmit data to
a group, e.g., DNS-SD [10] for local service announce-
ment exist, but are considered a risk in VPN as multi-
cast ampliﬁes bandwidth attacks.
Hence, for VPNs it is the most adequate choice to
construct distribution trees from each source node to-
wards the subscribers and to secure the communication
by individual security associations. This topology al-
lows minimizing latency and is still efﬁcient for a low
number of sources. In the following subsections we
will go into the assumptions, the optimization goals,
and details of the construction process.
4.1. Assumptions
The setup of the distribution tree is based on the fol-
lowing two postulates:
The maximum bandwidth of a multicast ﬂow is
known: In order to optimally reserve resources for
data forwarding in the peer-to-peer topology, it is
required to know the ﬂows maximum bandwidth. One
the one hand a too low estimation will most likely
lead to packet loss in forwarding VPN nodes, and on
the other hand a too large estimation will make the
distribution trees deeper, and thus increase latency.
However, for high bandwidth multimedia streams it is
easily possible to determine the exact bandwidth, and
the other expected ﬂows, e.g., for software updates, are
usually of low bandwidth and can be estimated rather
roughly.
Enough bandwidth in tree: To provide all clients
with the multicast ﬂows, the forwarding gateways need
to have enough upload bandwidth. In contrast to open
ALM services, this is not a large issue as participants
have an interest to contribute to the closed VPN com-
munity.
4.2. Optimization Goals
Starting from the security and efﬁciency objectives, it
is possible to derive the following goals:
Low tree height: In order to reduce latency and the
chance of a failure of intermediate gateways, the length
of the distribution paths and thus the height of the dis-
tribution tree shall be minimized. This is achieved by
pulling nodes with high bandwidth into higher posi-
tions of the tree, i.e., to provide a higher fan-out, and by
balancing the tree to better utilize bandwidth resources
of the higher nodes.
Preference of elder nodes: Depending on the length of
their sustained participation, elder and thus more sta-
ble nodes are to be placed in the higher regions of the
distribution tree. This does not only prevent mobile or
instable nodes to become important, but it may make it
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also harder for a potential attacker to identify important
other nodes.
Latency reduction: A further optimization goal is the
exploitation of local distribution, i.e., neighbored nodes
in the distribution tree should also be nearby in terms
of latency.
With #succ denoting the successor count,
capacity the free bandwidth, and c1···4 individual
weighting factors, a set of successor nodes can
subsequently be rated by the following function:
rating =c1
(
1− #succ
max#succ
)
+ c2
capacity
max capacity
+ c3
age
max age
+ c4
(
1− latency
max latency
)
This rating function is subsequently used to steer actual
optimization procedures.
4.3. Topology Control Mechanisms
In order to create a distribution tree with the sketched
properties, three mechanisms are used, utilizing the rat-
ing function. First, newly subscribed nodes will be
placed in accordance to the previously deﬁned opti-
mizations goals. Second, periodic tree balancing as-
sures an adaptation to changes in the transportation net-
work and the VPN itself. Additionally, topology adap-
tations occur due to the failure of nodes.
4.3.1. Node Join Operations
After detecting multicast clients in their network,
STORM gateways send a join message addressed to
the multicast group along the structured overlay of the
underlying VPN (see Fig. 2). Following the structure,
the join message will either arrive at the multicast
source after at most a logarithmic number of steps, or
it passes another node that is already member of the
searched group.
After reaching the source node or an intermediate
node, this node decides whether it has enough free
bandwidth for an additional child. If so, a security
association is established to the requesting gateway
and it becomes a child. Otherwise the discovered
group member searches for another suitable position
in the tree, according to the deﬁned rating function.
As children regularly report their free bandwidth and
successor counts, it is immediately able to determine,
if there is a suitable position in its own subtree. In this
case the request message is iteratively forwarded to the
best suited child. Alternatively, if there are not enough
resources in the subtree, the request is passed up, until
either a free spot is found or the source is reached. In
the later case, there are no resources in the distribution
tree at this time, thus violating the assumption of
sufﬁcient bandwidth and the request is rejected.
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Fig. 2. Example of a node joining a tree
This join operation causes at most a logarithmic
number of messages with regards to the number
of VPN nodes as the ﬁrst lookup step is bound to
logarithmic steps and the second step of escalating or
descending the distribution tree is bound to its height,
which is also logarithmic due to the balancing oper-
ations, explained below. Furthermore, exploiting the
topology aware structured overlay queries, chances are
that found intermediate nodes are actually also close in
terms of latency and topology of the transport network.
And while it would be a conceivable alternative to
register nodes with free bandwidth in the overlay
structure, and not the source node itself, in order to
release load from the higher regions of distribution
tree, the chosen approach allows for better balancing
properties.
4.3.2. Optimization for Latency & Robustness
Joining: As already sketched in the last section,
when receiving a join message, nodes having no free
bandwidth need to forward the request down one of
their subtree if there is still free capacity left. They
iteratively prefer the subtree with high capacity, low
latency and high age, by weighting these factors using
the rating function. However, to allow for a stable
construction of distribution trees without frequent
rebalancing operations, subtrees with considerable
larger size must be preferred regardless of the rating.
Tree Balancing: The regularly exchanged successor
count allows a parent to detect imbalances and perform
explicit adjustments between subtrees by relocating
children. As the other optimizations assure that only
leaf nodes have spare capacity and to retain preceding
optimizations, STORM attaches leaves of a subtree to
leaf nodes of another subtree, allowing elder nodes
to keep their higher positions. A conﬁgurable tree
balancing rate allows to adapt to different optimization
goals. Rate based balancing is achieved by calculating
the optimal number of children per subtree, that is
perSubTree = totalSuccsubTrees where totalSucc is the total
successors count of all subtrees and subTrees the
number of subtrees. The tree balancing rate simply
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speciﬁes the maximum deviation from this number.
Load Optimization: If a gateway has enough free
bandwidth for additional children, it may request more
direct successors from its current children in order to
relocate them to higher tree positions. Thus, latency
is reduced and robustness increases. Requesting
successors from a child with a high latency helps to
reduce transmission delays and preferring high ages
protects against attackers. The chosen child afterwards
determines one of its successors to offer to the parent
by utilizing the global optimization function
Position Switches: Parents regularly check if their
children have a higher rating as themselves. If so,
they change the position with the respective child
to optimize the local tree. However, these parent
initiated switches are very unlikely to occur except in
highly diverse scenarios as the age of the parent and
the number of total successors will always be higher
compared to his children. Thus, only large differences
in capacity or latency may lead to position switches,
depending on the weighting of these factors.
4.3.3. Node Failure Detection & Repair
In order to perform node failure detection, associated
VPN gateways already exchange periodic heartbeats.
If gateways detect the absence of a heartbeat and its
consecutive retransmissions, they will remove the cor-
responding security association. In case the failed node
was a multicast child, the only further actions required,
is the removal of the child from the successor list and
forwarding tables.
In case the failed node is its multicast parent,
searches for a new parents have to be initiated to
reintegrate directly affected nodes and their children
back into the tree. As all direct children of the failed
node will search for a new group parent, measures
have to be taken to ensure that they will not ﬁnd nodes
of affected subtrees; otherwise circular forwarding as-
sociations may emerge. To ﬁnd a new parent, the same
procedures as for the initial group join are used, that
is, a join message is routed along the overlay structure.
However, the join message is ﬂagged to be a multicast
recovery, ensuring that all gateways, including those
that are already member of the searched group, will
forward the message until it arrives at the multicast
source. Next, the source sends the join message
down the tree, until a free place is found at a gateway
that is consequently none of the separated children.
Other nodes are almost immediately informed of the
new tree situation as nodes report important changes
instantly to their parent without waiting for the next
cycle. The time until reintegration may nevertheless
be considerably long and depends on the interval at
which heartbeat messages are exchanged, the diameter
of the overlay structure, and on the height of the tree.
But as only the parent of a separated subtree will have
to be reintegrated, the number of exchanged messages
is kept at a minimum and preceding optimizations of
the subtree can be preserved. The costly reintegration
supports the motivation to keep the tree height as low
as possible and the most stable nodes close to the
source.
4.4. Implementation
STORM is implemented in three components: the
platform independent topology control, an OM-
NeT++/INET [11] library, and a Linux runtime
environment. This approach allows for a comprising
evaluation in simulations as well as real world scenar-
ios. And while the simulation environment is crucial to
discover large scale effects, the following section will
focus on the discovered problems and solutions of the
Linux prototype.
A rather often addressed problem is the estimation
of the outgoing bandwidth of a node. Unfortunately,
there are only two extreme solutions available: In
a naïve solution a rather lengthy bulk transfer is
performed towards a measuring host. A more elegant,
but more unreliable solution is the transmission of
short packet bursts and the consecutive measurement
of packet interframe gaps [12]. Assuming no cross
trafﬁc, the measured dispersion will reﬂect bottleneck
capacity. Thus, multiple measurements are required to
limit these effects. Furthermore, STORM uses differ-
ent corresponding nodes for its periodic measurements
to eliminate effects, where the incoming bandwidth of
the other side limits poses a bottleneck or a potential
attacker artiﬁcially limits the measurements.
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Fig. 3. Processing of multicast trafﬁc
For supporting generic multicast applications, the
Linux runtime environment manages the handling
of Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP)
messages. To emulate the behavior of a conventional
multicast router IGMP messages are intercepted by a
raw socket, and the kernel’s multicast API is utilized
to encapsulate packets in IPIP-Tunnels and forward
them to the successors. The trafﬁc is individually
encrypted at the gateways using Linux’s native IPsec
implementation in combination with strongSwan
[13]. Fig. 3 illustrates the detailed packet processing.
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To handle multicast trafﬁc with IPsec, the packet
originating from the multicast source and arriving at
the gateway’s virtual multicast interface is prepended
by an IPIP header. Depending on the position of the
child in the transport network, the packet may be
additionally secured using IPsec’s transport mode and
an IPIP header for indirectly reachable successors.
Consequently, by using a nested transport mode asso-
ciation, intermediate gateways cannot read or detect
multicast trafﬁc at all. Furthermore, STORM utilizes
IPsec’s Bound End-to-End Tunnel (BEET) mode to
allow NAT traversal and ﬁnally transmits the packet on
the network. The next gateway ensures with the help
of iptables and dynamic ﬁrewall rules that the inner
IP-addresses of the packet match the outer security
association. Thus, STORM provide the same security
level as tunnel-mode associations. Afterwards, the
multicast trafﬁc is forwarded to local receivers and
remote gateways using the same procedure as before.
5. EVALUATION
Our evaluation is separated in two sections: starting
with a qualitative discussion, quantitative, experimen-
tal results are given in the second part.
5.1. Qualitative Discussion
The following discussion is structured to reﬂect the ar-
rangement of the objectives.
1. Generic Multicast Distribution: While cur-
rently still limited to IPv4 multicast, STORM
allows for an application independent usage of
multicast within the VPN.
2. Transparency: Towards client computers
STORM gateways appear to be normal multicast
routers, thus no changes to existing applications
or operating systems are required.
3. Self-Conﬁguration: All performed operations
require no further conﬁguration, other than the
capabilities to provide access control. Addi-
tionally, the IP addresses of allowed multicast
senders may be restricted in source gateways for
security reasons.
From a non-functional view:
4. Scalability: Each gateway only stores informa-
tion about its parent and direct successors. All
operations are performed by using this informa-
tion, and the introduced messages are only ex-
changed between neighboring tree levels with a
maximum hop count that is limited by the tree
height.
5. Dynamics & Robustness: When searching for
a multicast group either a leaf is found or a
node in the middle of the tree with an already
exhausted bandwidth, as it would have otherwise
requested children from one of the subtrees.
Since exhausted nodes pass join requests down
the tree, new nodes are always inserted as leaves.
To keep more stable nodes in higher regions of
the distribution tree, also the tree optimization
algorithms take the node age into account,
consequently newer or unstable nodes stay in the
lower levels.
6. Efﬁciency: STORM uses regular topology
checks that minimize the delay with the help
of position switches. Additionally, other tree
optimization algorithms also take the latency
into account, providing different mechanisms
to reduce it. The same mechanisms assure a
low network load as a low latency also indicates
nearby network devices. Furthermore, the
locality aware search algorithm assures that
local forwarders are more likely to be found.
From a security perspective STORM fulﬁlls:
7. Conﬁdentiality: The IPsec-based VPN provides
encryption of all exchanged messages, ensuring
no other than the two communication endpoints
will be able to read the packet contents during
transport through the overlay. In particular, no
group keys are used in STORM.
8. Data Integrity & Authentication: IPsec also
provides data integrity checks and authenticates
each packet.
9. Access Control: Sending to a multicast group
is restricted by the corresponding STORM gate-
way, which must in turn be registered in the VPN
and authenticated by a certiﬁcate; otherwise mul-
ticast trafﬁc will not be forwarded. Subscribing
gateways also need to present a signed capability
certiﬁcate to join a multicast group.
10. Availability: As VPN and multicast distribution
are completely controlled by distributed mecha-
nisms, node failures will not affect the remaining
network as long as they do not interfere with
the multicast source gateway. Selecting nodes,
which have been contributing comparably
lengthy and stable, for the upper levels of the
distribution tree assures that successful DoS
attacks either require a long setup time or have
local effects only. Additionally, rate control
mechanisms assure that the multicast system
itself cannot be used to perform DoS attacks by
potentially compromised participants.
Thus, all in all STORM accomplishes the set goals
for VPN multicast from a qualitative point of view
rather well. Further detailed studies are given in the
following quantitative evaluation.
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Fig. 4. Mean message delays at different conﬁgurations
5.2. Quantitative Results
Simulated networks are derived from data collected by
CAIDA [14] to approximate actual Internet topologies
and provide realistic test environments. In particular,
OMNeT++ simulations were run in a network of 217
nodes with delays between neighboring gateways set to
100ms and between gateways and clients in their local
subnetwork to 0.1ms. Each gateway has a bandwidth of
100 Mbit/s whereas the multicast source generates traf-
ﬁc at 25 Mbit/s representing an IPTV H.264 HiP Level
4 stream. To avoid measuring effects of the overlay
creation, the multicast source gateway joined after 200
simulation seconds. Other Multicast gateways joined
uniformly between 200 and 2000 simulation seconds.
Unless otherwise stated, factor weightings for the rat-
ing function are 1.0.
5.2.1. Latency Optimization
For comparing inﬂuences of the rating function factors,
different latency weightings were simulated to measure
mean message delays between the multicast source and
each client. Additionally, different tree balancing rates
and their impact on message delays were evaluated.
Fig. 4 shows four different conﬁgurations with latency
weights 1.0 and 5.0 and tree balancing rates of 90% and
50%. As designed, higher latency weightings lead to
decreased message delays for both tree balancing rates.
By comparing different tree balancing rates, one can
see that lower rates lead to higher message delays as
individual tree branches will differ more in their height
and hence forwarding path lengths will increase. In
contrast, higher balancing rates will reduce the over-
all tree height as nodes are evenly distributed among
the tree branches.
6. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
Starting with the substantiation of the need for VPN
multicast, this article motivated a detailed and compre-
hensive set of objectives for deploying this service by
overlay networks. As current approaches were found
unsuitable, our novel approach – called STORM – was
presented. The qualitative and quantitative evaluation
show that the entered direction is promising, and worth
more detailed studies.
Hence, the focus of future research is planned to lay
on the optional utilization of multicast support within
the transport network, e.g., if some nodes are part of
the same local area network. Furthermore, work needs
to be done to study the interaction of multiple multi-
cast groups in order to reuse already existing tree struc-
tures. The incorporation of a reputation system might
allow to securely push badly performing participants
into the lower regions of the distribution tree. In con-
trast to usual environment of reputation systems, it may
be possible to take advantage of the tree structure and
the fact that sybil attacks are not possible within VPNs.
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